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Abstract 
During recessions, either declines in actual capital or increases in required capital 
may intensify pressures on banks. One way for banks to boost their capital ratios is by 
reducing their lending. However, one effect of systematic reductions in the supply of 
bank loans during recessions would likely be to accentuate the magnitudes of 
macroeconomic fluctuations. To reduce this source of “procyclicality”, it has been 
proposed that Basel II include “escape clauses”. Such clauses might, for example, operate 
so as to raise required bank capital during macroeconomic expansions and reduce it 
during downturns. 
Apart from formal escape clauses, procyclicality might be reduced or even 
reversed in practice if banks exercise sufficient discretion in reporting their charge-offs 
and loan loss provisions. We propose two hypotheses about the past cyclicality of such 
discretion. We hypothesize that individual banks tended to report fewer charge-offs and 
provisions when the banking system was troubled than when it was generally healthier. 
That suggested our second hypothesis: Banks tended to cluster more when the banking 
industry was troubled. Banks would maximize the value of their reporting discretion by 
clustering more then; being similar to other banks raised the likelihood that a bank would 
be able to exert reporting discretion when it encountered difficulties, because other, 
similar banks, and thus the banking system as a whole, would likely be troubled at the 
same time. 
We found some support for our hypotheses at large U.S. banks. During the late 
1980s, when banking was troubled and bank capital ratios were low, individual banks 
reported fewer charge-offs, ceteris paribus, when the capital ratios of their peers were 
lower. During the late 1990s, in contrast, when capital ratios were higher, charge-offs at 
individual banks were not systematically related to the capital ratios of peer banks.  We 
also found that the equity and the asset betas of individual banks tended to cluster more 
when banking was more troubled than they did when banking was less troubled.
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“We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately.” 
 
Benjamin Franklin, July 4, 1776 
I. Introduction 
Banks may come under capital pressure either because of declines in their capital 
or because of increases in required capital. Pressures on bank capital may reduce lending 
and output. Basel reformers have become concerned that the constant application in 
practice of a fixed set of capital regulations over the business cycle could accentuate the 
magnitudes of macroeconomic fluctuations.  That is, bank capital rules might then 
contribute to economies’ “pro-cyclicality”. If bank capital requirements are revised 
promptly on the basis of expected losses on bank assets, then increases in expected losses 
in and around recessions could raise banks’ capital requirements and thereby make bank 
lending more pro-cyclical than otherwise. In order to ameliorate the procyclicality of 
bank capital rules, “escape clauses” of some sort might be included in the reform of the 
Basel Accord. These clauses might, for example, require banks to hold more capital 
during economic expansions so that they would have it available to be drawn down 
during economic downturns. 
Determining whether bank supervision and regulation as a whole has been, or will 
be, pro-cyclical or countercyclical is problematic. Some elements of bank regulation, 
such as prompt revision of required capital in light of changed estimates of expected 
losses, may have pro-cyclical effects. Other elements may have countercyclical effects. 
For instance, “discretion” in the amounts of charge-offs and loan loss provisions reported 
by banks during troubled times might reduce, or even reverse, procyclicality attributable 
to increases in amounts of required capital and associated decreases in the supply of bank 
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loans. Banking supervision and regulations, either explicitly or implicitly, might allow 
banks to report fewer charge-offs and provisions for actual and expected loan losses 
when an entire banking system was under considerable stress than would otherwise be 
the case.  Such discretion would prop up earnings, retained earnings, and reported capital 
ratios. Such discretion might have countercyclical effects, as opposed to the procyclical 
effects that might emanate from rigid application of banking supervision and regulation. 
Bank supervisors might be skeptical of being asked to help manage, and be seen 
as helping to manage, macroeconomic outcomes. Discretion in banks’ reporting of loan 
loss provisions and charge-offs might exacerbate losses to banks and deposit insurers and 
confound appropriate application of countercyclical monetary policy. Allowing banks 
discretion in their reporting might (1) reduce the discipline of banks’ credit monitoring, 
(2) lead ultimately to larger amounts of problem loans, and (3) divert credit from its most 
efficient uses. In addition, monetary authorities may recognize that bank supervisors 
might respond to contractionary monetary policy by allowing banks to exercise more 
discretion, for example by permitting banks to avoid charging-off or “evergreening” 
loans.  To the extent that the amounts and effects of such reporting discretion are hard to 
quantify, monetary policy would be that much harder to conduct. 
Monetary authorities might compensate for the anticipated effects of increased 
reporting discretion by imposing stricter monetary policies than they would otherwise. 
The effects of the even-tighter monetary policy would be felt most keenly by borrowers 
whose loans would not benefit from the reporting discretion, such as variable-rate 
business borrowers with good credit ratings and borrowers at banks that do not engage in 
reporting discretion. 
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We seek empirical estimates of the extent to which the reported amounts of loan 
loss provisions and charge-offs at U.S. banks have varied, relative to the amounts that 
would have been expected in light of the conditions of their loan portfolios. More 
specifically, we seek estimates of the effects of the condition of banking generally on the 
amounts of charge-offs and provisions reported by individual banks. We use data for loan 
delinquencies, capital, earnings, and other bank variables for the 30 largest U.S. banks in 
each year from 1976 through 2001. We also examined the 1999 data for 9 large Japanese 
banks. 
We examine two hypotheses. The first hypothesis relates to discretion in banks’ 
reported amounts of loan charge-offs and loss provisions; the second relates to banks’ 
“safety in similarity.” Bank supervisors monitor and promote the safety and soundness of 
individual banks and thereby the banking industry. They may, however, apply different 
standards when problems are isolated in a few banks than when the banking industry 
generally is more troubled. When the banking industry generally is in good condition, 
bank supervisors might be more insistent that a troubled bank adhere to standard 
reporting requirements for loan charge-offs and provisions (and for other inputs to a 
bank’s financial statements). If an individual bank had sufficiently poor management, 
low earnings (perhaps due to large expected future loan losses), or heavy loan losses (and 
as a result had low capital ratios), supervisory action might follow the established norms 
for severity and speed. If the condition of the bank were sufficiently dire, to preclude 
larger losses later, bank supervisors might close the bank.1
In contrast, when the banking industry was generally quite troubled, bank 
supervisors might be attuned to the (1) macroeconomic repercussions of widespread 
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reductions in bank lending, (2) stability of the financial system, and (3) repercussions of 
widespread bank failures on bank supervisors and their organizations. In light of these 
considerations, we hypothesized that bank supervisors might grant banks more discretion 
in reporting charge-offs and provisions when the banking system is generally troubled 
than when problems are confined to a few banks. We refer to this as our “reporting 
discretion hypothesis.” 
We also hypothesize that supervisors are more likely to close atypical banks than 
to close average banks. Individual banks may employ business strategies that profit from 
differentiation from the strategies and markets of their competitors. During relatively 
good times, the value to an individual bank of reporting discretion is reduced because of 
relatively large earnings and relatively small amounts of charge-offs and provisions. In 
contrast, when the banking industry is generally troubled, banks benefit from “safety in 
similarity.” By being similar to each other, individual banks increase the odds that they 
are troubled at the same time as the industry generally.  Since the likelihood of reporting 
discretion rises as the banking industry becomes more troubled, a similar bank would be 
able to exercise reporting discretion when that discretion is most valuable to the bank, 
which is when the bank itself is troubled. This is our “safety in similarity hypothesis.”  
To confront our hypotheses with data, we estimated bank charge-off and 
provision equations and computed measures of bank similarity. We also examined how 
each varied over time. Our econometric estimates are consistent with banks’ exercising 
greater reporting discretion during troubled times. During the late 1980s, capital ratios at 
large U.S. banks were generally low and potentially over-stated due to reporting 
discretion.  At that time, the lower were the capital ratios at peer banks, the smaller were 
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the reported charge-offs at individual banks. During the late 1990s, average bank capital 
ratios were higher.  At that time, the capital ratios of peer banks had no detectable effects 
on the charge-offs reported by individual banks. Consistent with our hypothesis that 
banks seek safety in similarity, we found that banks chose market betas and asset betas 
that clustered together more when banking was troubled. 
Section II presents a brief literature and historical review of related issues. Section 
III details the data and methodology that we use. Section IV presents statistical results 
that address (1) the cyclicality of bank capital regulation and (2) discretion (or 
management) in bank accounting based on data from the era of U.S. bank and thrift crises 
in the 1980s and early 1990s and from the Japanese banking crisis since the 1980s. 
Section V summarizes the paper and discusses some of its implications. 
II. Literature and historical review 
In this section, we provide (1) a brief review of literature that is closely related to 
our reporting discretion hypothesis and (2) some preliminary evidence that banks tend to 
cluster more when the banking industry is troubled. 
The literature on the cyclicality and cyclical effects of bank capital requirements 
has sprung up and expanded considerably in recent years. Ranging from Bernanke and 
Lown (1991) through Van der Heuvel (2002), numerous studies have documented the 
effects in the U.S. on banks and on the economy of pressures on bank capital. Bliss et al. 
(2002) succinctly argue that the simple model of how expansionary monetary policy 
increases bank assets may be incomplete, because banks are subject both to reserve and 
to capital requirements. When capital requirements are binding, injection of reserves may 
not increase bank lending and may even reduce it. 
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Some accounting studies conclude that individual banks use loan loss provisions, 
charge-offs, and allowances to manage their reported amounts of regulatory and 
generally-accepted earnings and capital. For instance, Ahmed et al. (1999) use the 1990 
change in capital adequacy regulation to construct tests of capital and earnings 
management on loan loss provisions. The authors find evidence that loan loss provisions 
are used for capital management, but they do not find evidence that banks use loan loss 
provisions to manage reported earnings or to signal future earnings to outsiders. 
There is also literature on the laxity of bank supervisors in the U.S. and in Japan. 
For instance, Kane (1987, 1989) trumpets the dangers of capital forbearance at savings 
and loans. Hayakawa (2001) details the reticence of Japanese supervisors to close any 
banking institutions. Pilling (2002) notes that the reported amounts of nonperforming 
loans at Japanese banks are widely regarded as hugely underestimating the true amounts. 
Ioannidou (2002) finds that the Federal Reserve’s simultaneous roles of being banking 
supervisor and central bank compromise the latter, in that indicators of monetary policy 
affect the Fed’s actions as banking supervisor. Those same monetary policy indicators do 
not, however, affect the actions of the U.S. bank supervisors that are not responsible for 
monetary policy (the OCC and the FDIC).
Next, we present some evidence about reporting discretion at Japanese banks and 
about clustering by U.S. banks. To do so, we use two different measures: capital ratios 
for Japanese banks and the standard deviations of equity betas for U.S. banks. Figure 1 
shows the ratio of total capital to risk-weighted assets for 9 large Japanese banks in 1999. 
The narrow range (between 10 and 13 percent) across these banks fits the hypothesis of 
reporting discretion. It may be that the conditions of these Japanese banks and the 
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Japanese banking system are sufficiently dire that they cannot attract private capital.  As 
a result, it may be that individual banks are implicitly permitted to cap the amount of 
problem loans that they report so that they report having enough capital to satisfy Basel 
capital minimums. 
 
***  Put Figure 1 about here.  *** 
 
***  Put Figure 2 about here.  *** 
 
Figure 2 shows the ratio of total capital to risk-weighted assets for 5 large 
Japanese banks in 2002. Several developments have taken place between 1999 and 2002. 
The number of large banks fell as some of the weak large banks merged. These mergers 
can be described either as the takeover of weak institutions by slightly stronger ones or as 
mergers among roughly similarly weak institutions. Ibison (2002) concludes that 
Japanese banking is now dominated by even larger institutions, each with unclear 
corporate histories and ethos and each with high levels of inherited nonperforming loans. 
The range across capital ratios for the 5 large Japanese banks is even narrower (between 
10 and 11 percent) in 2002 than in 1999, which may suggest that even more reporting 
discretion has been exercised more recently. Not only does our hypothesis suggest that 
reported charge-offs and capital ratios may not be trustworthy, but it also suggests that 
until the backlog of unreported bad loans is cleared, lower reported charge-offs might 
indicate worsened, and not improving, banking conditions. 
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Figures 3 through 7 are based on data for the 30 largest U.S. banks in each year. 
Figure 3 presents average rates of return on assets (ROA) and average capital ratios for 
those banks for each year from 1976 through 2001. These data highlight that banking 
conditions were noticeably worse before the middle of the 1990s and have been markedly 
better since: Until the middle of the 1990s, banks’ ROAs and capital ratios were lower 
than since. (Moreover, the evidence presented in section IV below suggests that the 
reported capital ratios in the late 1980s may have been overstated.) After the early 1990s, 
both ROAs and capital ratios rose markedly. 
 
***  Put Figure 3 about here.  *** 
 
Figures 4 through 7 provide preliminary evidence that a generally weaker U.S. 
banking industry was associated with banks clustering more. Our data source did not 
have sufficient data to permit us to calculate capital ratios for individual banks before 
1986.  For each year from 1976 through 1985, we calculated capital ratios for the 30 
largest U.S. banks as follows: We subtracted the difference between the national 
aggregate bank capital ratio for 1986 and the weighted average for the 30 largest U.S. 
banks for 1986 from the national aggregate bank capital ratio for each year from 1976 
through 1985. We used the resulting data series as our measure of the weighted average 
capital ratio for the 30 largest U.S. banks. 
 
***  Put Figure 4 about here.  *** 
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Figure 4 compares (weighted by assets) average capital ratios with (weighted by 
assets) average equity betas.  Lower average equity betas are associated with (1) lower 
volatility relative to the stock market and typically (2) less total risk taking.  Figure 4 
shows that when average capital ratios were relatively low (ranging from 4.7 to 6.0 
percent between 1976 and 1991), average equity betas were also low (ranging from 0.70 
to 1.32). In contrast, when average capital ratios were higher (ranging from 7.0 to 7.8 
percent between 1992 and 2001), average equity betas were also higher (ranging from 
1.01 to 1.55). Although estimates of the average equity betas are somewhat volatile, 
figure 4 generally does support the hypothesis that banks reduce their (systematic) risks 
during troubled times. 
Banks’ equity betas may reflect not only their assets, but also their leverage. 
Figure 5 compares average capital ratios and average asset betas, which measure the 
underlying volatility of the market values of banks’ assets. Banks’ leverage fell 
considerably over this period as their capital ratios rose. When average capital ratios were 
low, average asset betas were also low (ranging from 0.038 to 0.073 between 1976 and 
1991). In contrast, when average capital ratios were higher, average asset betas were also 
higher (ranging from 0.079 to 0.116 between 1992 and 2001). Thus, figure 5 also 
supports the hypothesis that banks held less risky assets during troubled times. 
 
***  Put Figure 5 about here.  *** 
 
***  Put Figure 6 about here.  *** 
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***  Put Figure 7 about here.  *** 
 
Figures 6 and 7 compare average bank capital ratios with the standard deviations 
(across banks) of their equity betas and their asset betas, respectively. We calculated 
betas from banks’ own total equity returns, total returns on a broad market index, and the 
banks’ leverage ratios. Lower standard deviations of equity and asset betas imply that 
banks are more clustered. When average capital ratios were low, standard deviations of 
equity betas (ranging from 0.18 to 0.25 between 1976 and 1991) and standard deviations 
of asset betas (ranging from 0.011 to 0.019 between 1976 and 1991) were also low. When 
average capital ratios were higher, standard deviations of equity betas (ranging from 0.24 
to 0.42 between 1992 and 2001) and standard deviations of asset betas (ranging from 
0.020 to 0.038 between 1992 and 2001) were also higher. Thus, figures 6 and 7 support 
the hypothesis that banks more tightly mimicked each other when banking generally was 
more troubled. 
III. Data and methodology 
We use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to estimate equations that 
indicate reporting discretion at Japanese and U.S. banks. We use data on capital ratios, 
operating income, provisions for loan losses, and loan charge-offs for the 9 largest 
Japanese banks in 1999 from Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (1999). We also use panel 
data for the financial statements for the 30 largest U.S. banks for each year from 1976 
through 2001, the period for which Reports of Condition and Income Reports (Call 
Reports) are publicly available from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago database. 
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Thus far, we have not analyzed the hypothesis of “safety in similarity” 
econometrically. The figures discussed in Section II use accounting data for the largest 30 
U.S. banks for each year from 1976 through 2001 and data for the stock prices and 
returns for the 40 largest U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) for the same period. We 
obtained stock price data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CSRP). Our 
datasets for accounting data and stock prices do not overlap exactly. Using the S&P 500, 
we computed equity betas for each BHC over the time period and the mean and standard 
deviation across the 40 largest BHCs. We used the average capital ratios from our 
accounting data to impute the average asset beta for the 40 largest BHCs. 
We hypothesize that banks have more reporting discretion when the banking 
industry is troubled.  That implies that the amounts of charge-offs and provisions would 
be a function of the bank’s own conditions regardless of industry conditions.  It also 
implies that the impact of industry condition would rise as the condition of the banking 
industry deteriorated. 
We tested our hypotheses with variations of equation (1) for Japanese and U.S. 
banks, for different time periods, and for sample periods of varying length: 
(1)  ∑∑∑∑
=
−
=
−−
=
⋅+⋅+⋅=
2
0
2
0
2
1 j
jtj
k j
k
jtjk
i
jt
j
j
i
t OKxyy γβα
We use two measures of :  loan loss provisions and charge-offs.  We scale 
provisions by risk-weighted assets for Japanese banks and by gross loans for U.S. banks.  
We scale charge-offs by risk-weighted assets for Japanese banks and by gross loans for 
U.S. banks. 
i
ty
11 
To allow for lags, we included  lagged by one year and lagged by two years as 
independent variables. The  variables control for various conditions at each bank.  
For each we included two annual lagged terms, as well the contemporaneous term.
i
ty
k
jtx −
2 As 
control variables we include operating income, nonaccrual loans, allowance for loan 
losses, and bank capital.  For Japanese banks, we scale operating income by risk-
weighted assets. For U.S. banks, we define operating income as earnings before income 
tax and provisions and scale by total assets.  We scale nonaccrual loans by gross loans.  
We scale the allowance for loan losses by gross loans.  For Japanese banks, we use 
(Basel) total capital and scale it by risk-weighted assets. Total capital includes 
subordinated debt and the allowance for loan losses. For U.S. banks, we use total equity 
capital and scale by total (unweighted) assets. 
We also included the variable “Other banks – Capital to Assets Ratio” ( ) 
and its two annual lags. For each bank in each year, we calculate the values for this 
variable as the average of the capital to assets ratio across all other banks in the sample 
for that year (29 in the case of the U.S. data). Within any given year, the variation in this 
variable is minimal across banks. However, this variable captures the evolution of 
reported capital ratios for the banking industry across time. 
jtOK −
Absent reporting discretion, once we control for a bank’s own condition (capital, 
etc.), reported charge-offs and provisions would not rise with the average capital ratio at 
other banks. Absent reporting discretion, charge-offs and provisions might be negatively 
related to other banks’ capital ratios: Troubles in other banks that are reflected in reduced 
capital ratios might be correlated with factors that would raise charge-offs and provisions 
for a bank.  Obtaining positive coefficients on the variable that measures reported capital 
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at other banks then can be taken as support for the hypothesis that banks exercise more 
reporting discretion when other banks are in more trouble. 
IV. Results 
Tables 1 through 6 provide results for regressions of bank charge-offs and 
provisions for loan losses in Japan and in the U.S. Tables 1 and 2 provide the results for 
truncated versions of equation (1) for 9 large Japanese banks in 1999. Tables 3 and 4 
provide the results for similar regressions for the 30 largest U.S. banks in each year for 
various sample periods from 1977 through 2001. Tables 5 and 6 provide the results of 
regressions that include larger numbers of control variables for the 30 largest U.S. banks 
in each year for sample periods from 1985 through 2001. 
The regressions reported in tables 1 and 2 use as explanatory variables only a 
(Japanese) bank’s operating income (divided by risk-weighted assets) and a bank’s own 
total capital ratio. We do not find either charge-offs or provisions to be significantly 
affected by operating income. However, we do find that bank capital ratios significantly 
and positively affect reported charge-offs and provisions. This is consistent with banks 
acknowledging more bad loans not just when loans “sour,” but when their own reported 
capital ratios are high enough to withstand sour loans. 
 
***  Put Table 1 about here.  *** 
 
***  Put Table 2 about here.  *** 
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Using specifications similar to those in Tables 1 and 2, Tables 3 and 4 provide 
results based on data for 30 large U.S. banks in each year during 1977-2001 and for three 
smaller subsamples (1978-1983, 1986-1991, and 1994-1999). Each of these three 
subsamples is associated with distinct conditions for the U.S. banking system generally. 
The 1978-1983 period includes high inflation, high unemployment, a double-dip 
recession, but relatively few bank loan charge-offs. The 1986-1991 subsample also 
includes a recession, but is distinguished by its severe banking crisis and historically high 
charge-offs. The 1994-1999 subsample includes a long and vigorous economic 
expansion, low inflation, and low charge-offs. 
 
***  Put Table 3 about here.  *** 
***  Put Table 4 about here.  *** 
 
The dependent variables in Tables 3 and 4 are charge-offs and provisions. Each is 
scaled by gross loans (as opposed to risk-weighted assets). We scale the independent 
variables by total assets. Also, we include the capital to assets ratio for the other 29 
banks, lagged one year, instead of the capital ratio for each bank, which we use in Tables 
1 and 2. Looking across the columns of Tables 3 and 4, we see that the relations of 
reported charge-offs and provisions to earnings and capital vary across the subsamples.  
In particular, the larger coefficients in the earlier, more troubled period for banking 
supports the hypothesis that reporting discretion varies inversely with the overall 
condition of banking.3 A larger positive relation between reported charge-offs and 
provisions and earnings is consistent with lower earnings “allowing” banks to 
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acknowledge fewer of its bad loans by reporting fewer charge-offs and provisions. 
Concomitantly, when their earnings are higher, banks may reduce any accumulated 
backlog of under-reported charge-offs or provisions. 
The signs and significance of the coefficients on capital at other banks are not as 
stable across subsample periods as those for earnings. The estimated effects of other 
banks’ capital were insignificant when industry-wide charge-offs were low (1978-1983 
and 1994-1999). In contrast, during the 1986-1991 period, charge-offs and provisions 
were lower when other banks had lower capital ratios, which is consistent with our 
reporting discretion hypothesis. 
Tables 5 and 6 provide the results of regressing the same dependent variables on 
more control variables for the 30 largest U.S. banks in each year during 1985-2001 and 
for two smaller subsamples (1986-1991 and 1994-1999). The regressions in tables 5 and 
6 cover a shorter time period (1985-2001) than the regressions in tables 3 and 4 (1977-
2001) because of data limitations. We allowed for, but do not report in Tables 5 and 6 
Individual bank fixed effects. 
 
***  Put Table 5 about here.  *** 
***  Put Table 6 about here.  *** 
 
Tables 5 and 6 validate the earlier results. The (sums across rows within columns 
of the) estimated coefficients on the earnings variable are generally positive in each 
column of Table 5 and 6.  Similar to the results in Tables 3 and 4, the earnings 
coefficients are least significant during 1986-1991 and are less significant in the 
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regression for charge-offs and more significant in the regression for provisions. The 
estimated coefficients on other banks’ capital also generally follow the results for charge-
offs in Tables 3 and 4.  They do, however, less clearly validate the results for provisions. 
Mirroring the results in Tables 3 and 4, the estimated effects of other banks’ capital (and 
its one-year lag) on charge-offs are both positive and significant during 1986-1991, but 
are insignificant during 1994-1999. 
In contrast, the estimated effects of other banks’ capital (summed over all lags) on 
provisions conflicted with the results shown in Tables 3 and 4. The signs and significance 
of coefficients on other banks’ capital do not fit the pattern across time periods that is 
consistent with either reporting discretion or its absence. Visual examination of average 
charge-offs and provisions during 1986-1991 reveals that provisions are far more volatile 
during that period (and charge-offs far smoother) than during other periods. One 
possibility is that, during this period, bank supervisors exogenously imposed a more 
stringent set of standards for reporting charge-offs and provisions. 
The remaining results in Tables 5 and 6 are mixed.  Some do not have ready 
interpretations; some follow the predictions of economic theory; and some are just plain 
insignificant. For example, the estimated coefficients on nonaccruals and allowances 
comport with theory. The coefficients for nonaccruals are consistently positive and 
significant in both Tables 5 and 6. More non-accruals later lead to more provisions and 
more charge-offs. The estimated coefficients on loan loss allowances (lagged one-year) in 
the charge-off equations are consistently positive and significant, indicating that larger 
stocks of loss reserves imply that banks later will take larger charge-offs but can make 
smaller provisions. 
16 
The lagged own-capital coefficients are generally not statistically significant.  On 
the other hand, Table 5 shows that banks tended to record higher charge offs, ceteris 
paribus, when other banks had more capital.  During the troubled 1986-1991 period, 
then, individual banks tended to report fewer charge-offs as the capital ratio of their peer 
banks fell. During the less troubled period that followed, 1994-1999, individual banks 
showed no such tendency to reduce reported charge-offs as a function of the condition of 
peer banks. 
V. Summary and implications  
Banks typically come under capital pressure either because large loan losses 
reduce their capital or because changes in rules and regulations raise the amounts of 
capital that they are required to hold. In turn, capital pressures can lead to reductions in 
banks’ supply of loans. The Basel Accord may be revised in such a way that required 
capital promptly rises as expected loan losses rise, for example during recessions.  In that 
case, bank lending might become more procyclical than when required capital responds 
less to current conditions. To reduce the procyclicality of a revised Basel Accord, some 
argue for including “escape clauses.” Such clauses might, for example, require bank 
capital to rise during expansions, but perhaps allow it to fall during downturns. 
In a similar way, discretion in banks’ reporting of charge-offs and provisions may 
reduce the procyclicality that some have warned about and might have countercyclical 
effects on the macroeconomy. Banks may be permitted to exercise more discretion in 
their reporting of charge-offs and provisions when the banking system is generally 
troubled than when problems are isolated in a few banks. Such discretion may encourage 
clustering by banks because of “safety in similarity”. 
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Reforms in the U.S. such as the prompt corrective action (PCA) clauses of 
FDICIA seek to minimize future banking and deposit insurer crises and losses. PCA 
generally insists that restrictions on troubled banks become increasingly severe as the 
bank’s capital declines below various trigger ratios. In part, PCA is designed to reduce 
both the need and opportunities for regulatory forbearance. However, PCA and similar 
triggered policies might be undermined by reporting discretion that allows banks to avoid 
PCA being triggered. The hypothesis of reporting discretion posits that underreporting of 
problems will occur when banks and their supervisors find it preferable to keep reported 
capital ratios above some target.  
To test our hypotheses, we analyzed measures of bank similarity and loan 
provisions and charge-offs both for Japanese and U.S. banks. We found evidence of 
reporting discretion both for the U.S. in the late 1980s and for Japan in 1999. Thus, the 
evidence suggests reporting discretion did take place during troubled, pre-FFDICIA 
years. We also find that, during troubled times, banks tend to cluster more. 
We found little evidence of reporting discretion in U.S. banks by the late 1990s. 
That does not mean that reporting discretion will not emerge during future banking crises. 
Since FDICIA was enacted, banking has been quite profitable and capital ratios rose to 
their highest levels in more than a generation.  
Because of the macroeconomic repercussions of banking difficulties, it may, after 
all, be socially optimal that reporting discretion of the sort discussed here does emerge. If 
so, it may also be preferable that it be practiced consciously and consistently so that the 
policies of both private-sector banks and public-sector policymakers can better coordinate 
general policies and specific responses. Acknowledging and measuring the magnitudes of 
18 
reporting discretion in the past is a first step toward more coherent policies in both 
sectors. 
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Figure 1 
 
Total Risk-Weighted Capital Ratios at 9 Large Japanese Banks  
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Figure 2 
 
 Total Risk-Weighted Capital Ratios at 5 Large Japanese Banks 
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Figure 3 
 
Average Equity Capital Ratio and Average ROA for Large U.S. Banks 
 
Annual, 1976-2001 
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Figure 4 
 
Weighted Average Equity Capital Ratio and Weighted Average Equity Beta  
for Large U.S. Banks 
 
Annual, 1976-2001 
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Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (2003) and Center for Research in Security 
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Figure 5 
 
Weighted Average Equity Capital Ratio and Weighted Average Asset Beta  
for Large U.S. Banks 
 
Annual, 1976-2001 
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Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (2003) and Center for Research in Security 
Prices (2003). 
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Figure 6 
 
Weighted Average Equity Capital Ratio and Weighted Standard Deviation 
of Equity Betas for Large U.S. Banks 
 
Annual, 1976-2001 
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Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (2003) and Center for Research in Security 
Prices (2003). 
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Figure 7 
 
Weighted Average Equity Capital Ratio and Weighted Standard Deviation 
of Asset Betas for Large U.S. Banks 
 
Annual, 1976-2001 
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Table 1 
 
Relation of Charge-Offs to Operating Income and Capital 
 
Dependent Variable: Charge-offs / Risk-Weighted Assets 
Large Japanese Banks, 1999 
 
     
   (1) 
1. Constant    -0.05* 
  (2.29) 
2. Operating income / risk-weighted assets  0.13 
  (0.19) 
3. Total capital ratio  0.60** 
  (3.19) 
  Number of observations 9 
 R-squared 0.63 
  F-statistic 5.10 
 Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
** denotes significance at the 1 percent level. 
  * denotes significance at the 5 percent level. 
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Table 2 
 
Relation of Loan Loss Provisions to Operating Income and Capital 
 
Dependent Variable: Loan Loss Provisions / Risk-Weighted Assets 
Large Japanese Banks, 1999 
 
      
   (1) 
1. Constant     -0.01 
  (0.85) 
2. Operating income / risk-weighted assets     -0.21 
  (0.63) 
3. Total capital ratio   0.23* 
  (2.47) 
  Number of observations 9 
 R-squared 0.54 
  F-statistic 3.48 
 Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
** denotes significance at the 1 percent level. 
  * denotes significance at the 5 percent level. 
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Table 3 
 
Relation of Charge-Offs to Earnings and Other Banks’ Capital 
 
Dependent Variable: Charge-offs / Gross Loans 
30 Largest U.S. banks each year, Annual, 1977-2001 
 
    
1978-
1983 
1986-
1991 
1994-
1999 
1977-
2001 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1. Constant  -0.02  -0.02   0.00    0.01** 
   (1.31)  (1.34)  (0.80) (2.82) 
2. Earnings before income tax 
and provision / assets   1.29**   0.41   0.27**    0.67**
   (5.60)  (1.73)  (3.49) (10.43) 
3. Other 29 banks’ average equity capital / 
assets, lagged 1 year   0.29   0.55*  -0.00  -0.07* 
   (0.91)  (2.09)  (0.02)  (2.52) 
  Number of observations 180 180 180 750 
 Number of banks 35 56 69 106 
 R-squared 0.18 0.07 0.10 0.15 
  F-statistic   16.04**  4.27*     6.16**   54.50**
 Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
** denotes significance at the 1 percent level. 
  * denotes significance at the 5 percent level. 
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Table 4 
 
Relation of Loan Loss Provisions to Earnings and Other Banks’ Capital 
 
Dependent Variable: Loan Loss Provisions / Gross Loans 
30 Largest U.S. Banks each year, Annual, 1977-2001 
 
    
1978-
1983 
1986-
1991 
1994-
1999 
1977-
2001 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1. Constant    -0.03   -0.09**   -0.00  0.01* 
  (1.33) (4.53) (0.45) (2.31) 
2. Earnings before income tax 
and provision / assets     1.71**   0.75*     0.52**     0.93**
  (5.37) (2.13) (5.97)  (10.49) 
3. Other 29 banks’ average equity capital / 
assets, lagged 1 year 0.39     1.91**    -0.00   -0.15** 
  (0.87) (4.86) (0.01) (4.06) 
  Number of observations 180 180 180 750 
 Number of banks 35 56 69 106 
 R-squared 0.17 0.21 0.25 0.15 
  F-statistic   14.77**   15.79**   18.04**   56.91**
 Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
** denotes significance at the 1 percent level. 
  * denotes significance at the 5 percent level. 
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Table 5 
 
Relation of Charge-Offs to Banks’ Own Conditions and Other Banks’ Capital 
 
Dependent Variable: Charge-offs / Gross Loans 
30 Largest U.S. Banks each year, Annual, 1985-2001 
 
    
1986-
1991 
1994-
1999 
 1985-
2001 
   (1) (2) (3) 
1. Constant -0.06* 0.00 0.00 
  (2.00) (0.35) (1.58) 
2. Charge-offs / gross loans, lagged 1 year 0.05 0.00    0.21**
  (0.52) (0.02) (4.58) 
3. Charge-offs / gross loans, lagged 2 years -0.27**    0.00   -0.18**
  (2.85) (0.00) (4.08) 
4. Earnings before income tax and provision / assets 0.00     0.42**     0.32**
  (0.00) (6.24) (5.19) 
5. Earnings before income tax and provision / assets, lagged 1 year    -0.16   -0.14    -0.06 
  (0.71) (1.51) (0.82) 
6. Earnings before income tax and provision / assets, lagged 2 years 0.18  -0.20**    -0.09 
  (1.02) (3.06) (1.69) 
7. Nonaccrual loans / gross loans     0.13**    0.43**    0.13**
  (2.68) (5.83) (5.44) 
8. Nonaccrual loans / gross loans, lagged 1 year 0.12 0.00 0.07 
  (1.67) (0.02) (1.95) 
9. Nonaccrual loans / gross loans, lagged 2 years 0.07 0.05    -0.03 
  (1.05) (0.86) (1.11) 
10. Allowance for loan and lease losses / gross loans, lagged 1 year  0.19*    0.21**    0.15**
  (2.54) (2.76) (4.12) 
11. Allowance for loan and lease losses / gross loans, lagged 2 years 0.00   -0.22**  0.09* 
  (0.05) (3.35) (2.38) 
12. Equity capital / assets, lagged 1 year    -0.05    -0.02    -0.05 
  (0.42) (0.63) (1.74) 
13. Equity capital / assets, lagged 2 years -0.23 0.01 0.01 
  (1.78) (0.31) (0.42) 
14. Other 29 banks’ average equity capital / assets  0.55* 0.06 0.03 
  (2.62) (0.91) (0.57) 
15. Other 29 banks’ average equity capital / assets, lagged 1 year    0.83**   -0.01 0.05 
  (2.81) (0.19) (0.91) 
16. Other 29 banks’ average equity capital / assets, lagged 2 years 0.12   -0.03 -0.11 
    (0.36) (0.24) (1.88) 
  Number of observations 178 179 504 
 Number of banks 55 69 101 
 R-squared 0.63 0.53 0.59 
  F-statistic   12.13**    7.12**   37.98**
 Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. 
 ** denotes significance at the 1 percent level; * denotes significance at the 5 percent level. 
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Table 6 
 
Relation of Loan Loss Provisions to Banks’ Own Conditions 
and Other Banks’ Capital 
 
Dependent Variable: Loan Loss Provisions / Gross Loans 
30 Largest U.S. Banks each year, Annual, 1985-2001 
 
    
 1986-
1991 
 1994-
1999 
 1985-
2001 
  (1) (2) (3) 
1. Constant 0.08  0.02* 0.01 
  (1.66) (2.06) (1.29) 
2. Loan loss provisions / gross loans, lagged 1 year    -0.10    0.59** -0.12 
  (0.47) (4.71) (1.62) 
3. Loan loss provisions / gross loans, lagged 2 years -0.12 0.01 0.09 
  (0.83) (0.12) (1.71) 
4. Earnings before income tax and provision / assets 0.53     0.42**    0.56**
  (1.79) (5.72) (5.67) 
5. Earnings before income tax and provision / assets, lagged 1 year 0.36   -0.29** 0.17 
  (0.97) (2.77) (1.47) 
6. Earnings before income tax and provision / assets, lagged 2 years    -0.02 0.11 0.09 
  (0.07) (1.37) (1.01) 
7. Nonaccrual loans / gross loans     0.53**   0.20*     0.51**
  (6.62) (2.53) (12.63) 
8. Nonaccrual loans / gross loans, lagged 1 year 0.24   -0.13 -0.110 
  (1.95) (1.36) (1.86) 
9. Nonaccrual loans / gross loans, lagged 2 years 0.06 0.07 0.00 
  (0.50) (1.22) (0.09) 
10. Allowance for loan and lease losses / gross loans, lagged 1 year  -0.45* -0.18*  -0.18* 
  (2.27) (2.14) (2.13) 
11. Allowance for loan and lease losses / gross loans, lagged 2 years 0.15 -0.18*   -0.05 
  (0.81) (2.33) (0.65) 
12. Equity capital / assets, lagged 1 year 0.23    -0.01   -0.04 
  (1.08) (0.21) (0.81) 
13. Equity capital / assets, lagged 2 years 0.23 0.02 0.02 
  (1.10) (0.57) (0.43) 
14. Other 29 banks’ average equity capital / assets   -1.29** 0.01   -0.30**
  (3.86) (0.21) (3.29) 
15. Other 29 banks’ average equity capital / assets, lagged 1 year    -0.06  -0.16*    0.28**
  (0.14) (2.23) (3.01) 
16. Other 29 banks’ average equity capital / assets, lagged 2 years -0.88 -0.14 -0.11 
    (1.58) (1.15) (1.10) 
  Number of observations 178 179 504 
 Number of banks 55 69 101 
 R-squared 0.62 0.62 0.53 
  F-statistic   11.66**   10.49**   28.92**
 Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. 
 ** denotes significance at the 1 percent level; * denotes significance at the 5 percent level. 
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1 If an individual bank is large enough (“too big to fail,” TBTF), regulators may relax standards in order to 
increase the chances of the bank’s survival, to minimize disruptions to the bank’s continuing deposit and 
credit operations, and to avoid closing a large bank during the regulators’ tenure. TBTF may have applied 
during the 1980s in the U.S. to about a dozen banks. It is not clear how many (if any) banks TBTF applied 
to since then.  TBTG may mean too big to cease operations or be liquidated.  It need not preclude formal 
insolvency or a shotgun marriage to another institution.  The 10th largest U.S. bank in 2001 was Sun Trust 
Bank (Atlanta, GA), which had about $100 billion in assets and 1.6% of all U.S. commercial bank assets. 
2 For allowances for loan losses and total equity capital, we included only the two lagged variables and not 
the unlagged variable. 
3 The results for charge-offs and provisions for loan losses are broadly similar across tables 3 and 4. Thus, 
we do not discuss them separately and refer to both as “reported bad loans.”  
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